乡村公共服务市场化的非对称风险困境研究——以江西省婺源县为例
The Dilemma of Asymmetric Risk in Rural Public Service Marketization: A Case Study of Wuyuan County in Jiangxi Province
杨洁莹
南京市城市规划编制研究中心规划师，博士
张京祥
南京大学建筑与城市规划学院教授，博士生导师，博士
周子航
香港中文大学地理与资源管理学院博士研究生
摘要: 在乡村振兴过程中，越来越多的地方通过与企业合同契约的方式，推进乡村某些领域公共服务的市场化。然而在政企合作中也存在着潜在的结构性风险，如何构建乡村公共服务可持续治理模式成为难题。基于非对称风险理论视角，以江西省婺源县乡村垃圾市场化处理为案例，深入剖析乡村公共服务市场化下各主体的角色与面临的困境。由于公共服务市场化合同难以将权责一并打包给企业，导致市场风险向乡镇基层政府转化，加之村民主体性缺乏，整体表现为非对称性风险格局。因此，需要在乡村公共服务市场化的过程中构建风险—收益对称的格局，摆脱不平衡的“刚性兑付”，促进责任下放与风险转移同步推动，积极推动村民参与风险共担，激发村民在乡村振兴中的主体意识。
Abstract: In the process of rural revitalization, more and more local governments are promoting the marketization of public services in certain areas of rural areas through contracts with enterprises. However, there are potential structural risks in government-enterprise cooperation, and how to construct a sustainable governance model for rural public services has become a difficult problem. Based on the perspective of asymmetric risk theory, this article takes the marketization of rural waste treatment in Wuyuan County, Jiangxi Province as a case, and deeply analyzes the roles and difficulties faced by various entities under the marketization of rural public services. The article finds that it is difficult for public service marketization contracts to package rights and responsibilities to enterprises, which leads to the transformation of market risks to the township and township grassroots government. In addition, the village's lack of democracy is an asymmetric risk pattern as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to build a risk-return symmetrical structure in the process of marketization of rural public services, get rid of the unbalanced "rigid payment", promote the simultaneous promotion of responsibility decentralization and risk transfer, actively promote villagers to participate in risk sharing, and inspire villagers in the countryside subject consciousness in revitalization.
关键词：乡村公共服务市场化；非对称风险；网络治理；风险分担；婺源县
Keyword: marketization of rural public services; asymmetric risk; governing by network; risk sharing; Wuyuan County
中图分类号：TU984
文献标识码: A
资金资助
国家自然科学基金项目 城市创新空间的生成机制与空间供给研究——基于长三角地区的实证 52078245
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